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Abstract 
Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) form an integral part of the South African government 
strategy to attract investment. SDIs are claimed to be short-term and targeted undertakings to 
foster economic growth.  
 
This working paper reviews two SDI projects, namely the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) 
and the West Coast Investment Initiative (WCII). The paper outlines many strengths within the 
MDC and WCII and draws out lessons to be learned that could improve the delivery of ongoing 
and future SDIs.
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Currently, projects under the umbrella term “Spatial Development Initiatives” (SDIs) form an 
integral part of the South African government strategy to attract investment, both local and 
foreign. Launched in 1995, SDIs are claimed to be short-term and targeted undertakings to foster 
economic growth by fashioning globally competitive spatial entities  new investment, 
infrastructural development and job creation. SDIs ‘aim to facilitate the creation of viable new 
jobs, as potential investment opportunities, identified through the process, are taken up by the 
private sector’.1 The SDI methodology seeks to identify and then facilitate economic potential in 
particular locations in South Africa by enhancing their attractiveness for investment.2 These SDIs 
are a strategic attempt by the state, in tandem with the private sector, to ‘unlock inherent 
economic potential in specific spatial locations in southern Africa’.3 Both the Maputo 
Development Corridor (MDC) running from Witbank in Mpumalanga to Maputo, capital of 
Mozambique, and the West Coast Investment Initiative (WCII) are examples of ongoing SDIs.  
The SDI methodology calls for a limited time frame of central involvement. For many of the SDI 
projects, the exit phase has been arrived at, and the ordering for these ongoing SDIs are being 
negotiated and implemented. Hence, a crucial period has been reached where prospective 
management systems, strategies and institutional arrangements need to be tracked. This working 
paper demonstrates some of the strengths within the methodology of the SDIs reviewed such as 
the establishment of various bodies to deal with capacity constraints and the establishment of 
strong project teams. However, perception of the SDI process appears generally negative, with 
one recent commentary asserting that ‘although the majority of South Africa’s fourteen spatial 
development initiatives got off to an inspired start, many seem to have petered out at the crucial 
investment stage’.4  
  
                                                 
1 ‘Spatial Development Initiatives in Southern Africa’, www.sdi.org.za  
2 See Ian Taylor Review of Spatial Development Initiatives: Methodology and Application of Resources, report commissioned by 
the Department of Trade and Industry, and the Development Bank of Southern Africa, November 2000. 
3 ‘Spatial Development Initiatives in Southern Africa’, www.sdi.org.za 
4 Business Day (Johannesburg) December 4, 2000. 




2. Key Background Issues 
Before embarking on a review of each of the two SDIs individually, it is useful to reflect on the 
broader concerns that underpin a review of the SDI programme in general.  It is also important to 
examine the specific objectives of the SDI programme.  Different emphases and nuances emerge 
from various official documents and in presentations by key stakeholders.  Investment promotion 
(both domestic and foreign direct investment), infrastructure development, economic growth, job 
creation, export promotion are all SDI objectives. Internal consistency in the objective function of 
the SDI programme needs to be checked, with respect to the specific incentives built (explicitly 
or implicitly) into the programme.   
Given the pre-eminence of investment promotion as an objective, it is important to note that 
domestic investors and foreign direct investors may present different risk/uncertainty profiles. For 
example, it may be that domestic investment and FDI respond differently to specific incentives, 
given that they are likely to have different risk/uncertainty perceptions (in part, as a result of 
asymmetric information). 
In general an assessment of the impact of the SDI programme raises questions concerning the 
rationale for South Africa’s industrial policy and the role of incentives in influencing firm-level 
decision-making processes given the spatial focus of the SDI programme. More specifically, South 
Africa’s regional industrial policy is the focus. We need to reflect on factors influencing the 
location of economic activity5.  In the context of a review of the SDI programme, we need 
therefore to ask first, what impacts on the firm’s investment decision (new investment and 
expansion of productive capacity), and second, how does it decide where to locate.  How 
important are incentives in investment decisions, relative to other factors such as risk, uncertainty, 
return, general macroeconomic conditions, market access conditions, and other micro polices, to 
the firm? 
Focusing on the firm’s location decision usually brings us to some conception of agglomeration 
economies and market access conditions.  Agglomeration effects relate not only to the attraction 
of clustering and the potential for inter-firm co-operation and competition, but also to the 
dynamic of the general economic environment, which is contributed to by the agglomeration of 
different and even quite unrelated economic activities. The latter factor is closely related to 
market access issues. Access to both product/service markets and factor markets (labour, finance, 
technology etc) will be taken into account by firms considering location options and thus these 
are issues that policy-makers need to take into account when devising policy aimed at influencing 
location decisions.  Note that some of these issues are not examined in depth here, rather simply 
flagged, in order to situate the reviews of the MDC and WCII in a broader context. It is also 
important to keep in mind that agglomerations take time to develop and therefore the time 
dimension needs to be reflected on too. This is particularly relevant to an assessment of short, 
focused interventions envisaged in terms of the SDI methodology.  
                                                 
5 More general questions concerning the identification of SDI locations, location-specific characterisitics, potential and 
challenges obviously need to be asked too. 
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3. The Maputo Development Corridor 
The eastern part of South Africa, with its ready access to the port of Maputo in Mozambique, is 
seen as a prime candidate for the construction of an SDI.6 Launched in May 1996, the aim is a 
developmental axis between the Maputo port and Gauteng. The economic logic lies in the reality 
that this is the shortest route to an export harbour for South Africa’s industrial heartland. Specific 
objectives of the MDC are to rehabilitate the primary infrastructure along the Corridor using the 
private sector; to encourage private investment in the inherent potential of the Corridor and in 
the opportunities afforded by rebuilt infrastructure; and to safeguard development and 
employment creation through growth.7 The main particulars of the MDC are follows: 
• Single toll road - the N4 from Witbank to Maputo Predicated upon the build operate and 
transfer (BOT) principle, this will be the largest road project yet undertaken in sub-Saharan 
Africa, rehabilitating 380 km of existing road and building about 50 km of new road in 
Mozambique. The project’s value is in excess of US$ 180 million and is expected to create 
‘at least 2,000 jobs’.8 It was financed by a private consortium, Trans-African Concessions, and 
was inaugurated in June 1998.  
• Port of Maputo The MDCs raison d’être is to link up with the global economy. Therefore, a 
working port at Maputo is crucial. Its renewal and upgrading will enable it to play a vital role 
in reducing transport-related costs for exporters, thereby improving their global 
competitiveness and increasing profitability. The private sector is planning to take a 67 
percent share in a joint venture with the Mozambican government, expected to total around 
US$ 170 million.  
• Railway links to Maputo Three railway lines run to the port of Maputo and form the rail 
arteries of the MDC: the Goba line from Swaziland; the Limpopo line from Zimbabwe and 
the Ressano Garcia line from South Africa. Rehabilitation of the lines, signal equipment and 
rolling stock are required after two decades of sabotage by South Africa. Total cost of 
upgrading the 90 km rail link between Maputo and Ressano Garcia on the South African 
border is expected to be around US$ 20 million. Seventeen new locomotives and five 
hundred wagons costing around US$ 80 million are scheduled to be purchased as part of the 
line’s rehabilitation.  
• One-stop border facility To facilitate easy access and the flow of goods and people between 
the two countries, a single border facility has been planned at Komatipoort/Ressano Garcia. 
This facility should reduce cross-border bottlenecks by providing a one-stop border control 
procedure. This is expected to cost US$ 20 million.  
• Sectoral Investments There are a number of very large investments planned and/or under 
construction. Notable among these are the Mozal aluminium smelter near Maputo worth 
US$ 1.3 billion; the Pende gas extraction project costing US$ 700 million north east of 
Maputo; the US$ 300 million heavy minerals project adjoining Red River near Tzaneen in the 
Northern Province and the US$ 300 million ilmenite/magnetite and vanadium project (also 
near Tzaneen).  
 
                                                 
6 David Lewis and Robin Bloch ‘SDIs: Infrastructure, Agglomeration and the Region in Industrial Policy’, Development 
Southern Africa, vol. 15, no. 5, Summer 1998, p. 729. 
7 Interim Co-ordinating Committee A Development Perspective: Maputo Development Corridor Pretoria: Government Printer, 
1996. 
8 ‘World Bank to Look at Ways of Funding Maputo Corridor’, Cape Times (Cape Town) April 3, 1997. 




3.1 Economic objectives 
As already mentioned, the objectives of the MDC, and the SDI programme more generally, were 
to stimulate foreign investment, export earnings and to generate growth and development in 
specific spatial areas. Within the MDC a number of incentives were created to stimulate industrial 
location within the spatial area. These included low interest loans for exports, establishment 
grants, relocations grants, venture capital and the encouragement of additional production shifts.9 
However, a relatively limited proportion of new business activity has been generated amongst 
previously disadvantaged communities. The mega-projects in particular are predicated upon 
familiar “trickle down” effects, which have some credibility problems. Even if such projects seek 
to stimulate local down-streaming (as the SDI objectives demand), the state will need to engage 
in critical interventions to propitiate a suitable legislative and institutional environment. Simply 
relying on implementing “sound macro-economics” is unlikely to be adequate and an assortment 
of micro-economic policies, as well as support strategies, are required. This is particularly so if 
small, medium and micro-enterprises (SMMEs) are to be encouraged within the broader strategy 
of promoting local development.10 Perhaps instead of seeking to attract elusive FDI, more 
attention should be given to requiring local capital into a developmental mode via instruments 
such as asset requirements for institutional investors and reinvestment back into the community 
structures (through legislation if necessary) of the banking sector. Such community-oriented 
finance could be used to support SMMEs and projects such as investments in labour-intensive 
agri-processing.  
3.2 Achieving public aims through mega-projects? 
The high cost of the anchor projects associated with the MDC has led to a great deal of criticism. 
The public aims of SDIs were tabled as important (sustainable) job creation initiatives. At the 
launch of the MDC, 180 proposed projects were offered to investors, with a total value of around 
US$ 7 billion. According to one account, ‘it was estimated that these proposals, covering 
Mozambique, Mpumalanga and the Northern Province, had the potential to create up to 35,000 
jobs’.11 This represents a colossal amount of financing in order to “create” a relatively modest 
amount of employment. Whether such jobs are permanent is unrecorded, but seem to be 
connected to construction work on rebuilding primary infrastructure in and around the Corridor. 
Working on this given figure the Maputo Corridor appears incredibly capital-intensive: in return 
for allowing large parts of the Corridor to be effectively privatised, employment - its permanence 
uncertain - is being created costing around US$ 200,000 per job. Lest one thinks that this is an 
over-exaggeration, South Africa’s trade and industry minister announced in late 1997 that the 
Corridor ‘was expected to attract investment of up to R25 billion creating 8,000 jobs’ - working 
out to around US$ 500,000 per new job created.12 The appropriateness or otherwise of 
promoting such massively capital-intensive projects in a labour-surplus economy is obviously 
controversial.13 
Furthermore, the quality and nature of employment opportunities afforded by such anchor 
projects is problematic, if the articulated public aims of the SDI methodology are taken seriously. 
With a low skills base, opportunities for most of the local work force is likely to be casual, low-
paid and short-term, with minimal skills transferral of any discernible sort. Indeed, a number of 
                                                 
9 Interview with Gordon Griffiths, Chief Executive Officer, Mpumalanga Investment Initiative, Nelspruit, April 4, 2000. 
10 On this, see Christian Rogerson ‘Road Construction and Small Enterprise Development: The Experience of the N4 Maputo 
Corridor’, Development Southern Africa, vol. 17, no. 4, October 2000. 
11 Jonathan Mitchell ‘The Maputo Development Corridor: A Case Study of the SDI Process in Mpumalanga’, Development 
Southern Africa, vol. 15, no. 5, Summer 1998, p. 762. 
12 ‘The Maputo Development Corridor’ Cape Times (Cape Town) December 20, 1997. 
13 See also CM Naude and SK McKoskey ‘Spatial Development Initiatives and Employment Creation: Will They Work?’, paper 
presented at Trade and Industry Policy Secretariat Annual Forum, Muldersdrift, September 18-20, 2000. 
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projects along the Maputo Corridor have employed outsiders (extra-provincial and extra-national), 
with local people employed in menial positions. The industrial focus on minerals and metals and 
slightly processed goods (such as steel) seems ill-suited to a spatial area where agriculture is 
dominant and where investment in relatively low-skills based agri-processing and other spin-offs 
would be more suitable.14 Certainly, it has been shown that it is not enough simply to have mega-
projects based on infrastructure and minerals processing.15  
Obviously, it is acknowledged that with Mozambique being in the precarious economic 
position that it is, with the need to finance post-war reconstruction and service its untenable 
foreign debt, the attractiveness for the state of the mega-projects, with their potential of 
generating a large amount of hard currency inflows, cannot be dismissed (or, probably overtly 
criticised). When the private sector proposed such a project, Maputo obviously was very 
welcoming. However, the mega-projects have been cast as part of the SDI programme, which 
talks a great deal about sustainable development, eco-friendliness and job creation. It seems that 
it would have been better to rather concentrate on lower level projects as part of the SDI 
programme and leave such mega-projects to their private initiators (although the DTI and its 
Mozambican equivalent would clearly need to remain engaged).  
Promoting low-level industries, such as agricultural-based industries, would certainly foster a 
degree of skills transferral and community involvement, much of it labour-intensive. This would be 
far greater than the type of mega-projects advanced thus far and would ensure local community 
support. According to one source, skilled labour in Mpumalanga was a serious problem, and joint 
venture involving training and relatively low-skilled industrial projects was more appropriate.16 
Certainly, an active project to stimulate agri-processing would build upon competitive advantages 
extant in the spatial area and build upon existing skills and knowledge. It would also be less 
capital-intensive and more labour-intensive, contributing to grassroots development that the 
current huge projects obviously lack. Industries that could benefit from such promotion include 
fresh water fish breeding, strawberry hydro culture, LaChenalia bulb production, citrus production 
and cotton production. 
By promoting such agriculturally based projects, empowerment issues would be greater served. 
So far, although the SDI programme claims to have empowerment as a key objective, there 
seems to be very little explicit gender policy within the MDC.17 In the affirmative action policy, 
which is supposed to be integrated into SDI projects, gender is not specifically emphasised.18 As 
one source put it, ‘sadly, the only industry that appears to be working for women is sex work that 
has sprung up along the [N4] highway, which is unfortunately accompanied by the increase in 
HIV and AIDS’.19 Gender and associated affirmative action measures (such as promoting Black 
empowerment) need to be re-thought and seriously incorporated into the objectives and 
methodology of the MDC. This could be much easier implemented if the projects were of a less 
“mega” size and where the skills requirement was less onerous. Indeed, such smaller projects 
would accommodate capacity-building schemes and training programmes that are far more 
sustainable (and transferable) than steel mills etc.  
Where empowerment projects have been advanced, such as in tourism and forestry, a lack of 
regulatory legislation as well as disagreement and disjuncture between the provincial and national 
                                                 
14 There is an agri-industrial cluster developing around Nkomazi, though it is in its initial stages.  
15 Interview with David Arkwright, project manager, Maputo Corridor, Nelspruit, April 12, 2000. 
16 Interview with Gordon Griffiths, Chief Executive Officer, Mpumalanga Investment Initiative, Nelspruit, April 4, 2000. 
 17 See Commission for Gender Equality Gender Analysis of the Maputo Development Corridor Projects Johannesburg, 2000.  
18 The two points (out of one hundred) allocated for gender representation in the government points system for the awarding of 
contracts is trivial and wholly inadequate. 
19 Colleen Lowe-Morna, quoted in ‘Multi-Billion Rand Corridor Great for Men, Poor for Women’, African Eye News Service 
(Nelspruit), February 14, 1999. 




levels has effectively sabotaged such efforts.  Struggles over responsibilities and competencies 
have led to the negative outcome where little was achieved. 
3.3 Methodology employed in the MDC 
It is apparent that high expectations were built around projects within the MDC. According to 
one source, ‘too high expectations were raised through premature announcements - the build-up 
was too much’.20 According to another (Mozambican) source, the MDC concept was ‘over-
enthusiastic at the beginning and did not establish legal and institutional mechanisms before the 
project began’. The conclusion was that it ‘would have been much better to wait’.21 One of the 
contractors on the N4 toll road found that this over-selling had created a number of problems for 
their operations, asserting that ‘the expectations of the communities involved in and impacted by 
the [MDC] project are extremely high. [This is] a source of concern as it may create negative 
perceptions of [the contractor] and the road’.22  
 Whilst the promotion of the MDC was obviously necessary and a certain amount of over-
selling was perhaps required, more realistic evaluations of what was possible would have been 
better advised. It appears that there was no real debate on the MDC prior to its public launch.23 
Exaggerating the potential and readiness of the MDC to receive investment has led to 
disappointment on the part of prospective investors who may be reluctant to return if turned 
away at their first expression of interest.24  
The emphasis on speed within the SDI methodology precludes serious engagement with 
stakeholders outside of the financial sector. In particular, on the Mozambican side, legal and 
institutional mechanisms were not established, nor given sufficient time to begin working, before 
the project began.25 According to one source:  
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the government’s custodian of 
GEAR and its SDI-offshoots, has taken a hard line and non-negotiable stand 
on the planning of SDI projects, particularly when it comes to issues of 
grassroots participation, given the fast-track nature of the SDI processes.26  
Certainly, the implementation of a fast track approach in Mozambique has caused problems in 
an environment where capacity to evaluate the implications of projects is currently limited.27 The 
wider MDC project was originally a programme set in motion within Mpumalanga to help 
stimulate development from an integrated approach, with concentration on SMME development, 
policy research, capacity building, pilot projects etc.  This original programme, reporting back to 
the Department of Transport was subsumed by the SDI project.  As has been pointed out by a 
diverse array of informants, this new SDI programme was heavily centralised and focused on 
speed and big bang anchor projects, and eager to push industrial process issues.  This situation 
was compounded by the nature of the process of engagement with the local community.   As 
one analysis remarked,  
                                                 
20 Interview with Gordon Griffiths, Chief Executive Officer, Mpumalanga Investment Initiative, Nelspruit, April 4, 2000. 
21 Interview with Dr Alfredo Namitete, Chairman, Committee of Senior Officials, Southern African Transport and 
Communications Commission, Maputo, April 6, 2000. 
22 Trans-Africa Concessions Human Resources and Social Responsibility: Managerial Plan for the Implementation of Annexe 
Eight Midrand: TRAC, 1997, p. 3. 
23 Interview with David Arkwright, project manager, Maputo Corridor, Nelspruit, April 12, 2000. 
24 Interview with Gordon Griffiths, Chief Executive Officer, Mpumalanga Investment Initiative, Nelspruit, April 4, 2000. 
25 Interview with Dr Alfredo Namitete, Chairman, Committee of Senior Officials, Southern African Transport and 
Communications Commission, Maputo, April 6, 2000. 
26 Dudley Moloi ‘There’s Logic in SDIs, But…’, Land and Rural Digest, vol. 1, no. 1, June/July, 1998, p. 16. 
27 Interview with Francisca Henriqueta Soares, transport economist, Mozambican Ministry of Transport and Communications, 
Maputo, April 10, 2000. 
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In Mpumalanga, there has been limited communication about the MDC 
between the provincial government and local government communities, the 
private sector and organised labour. It is a paradox that, although the 
Corridor is well known nationally and internationally, many local 
communities, which will be directly affected by the development, have very 
little information on the project.28  
Many local residents are outraged that placing tolls on the N4 will separate them from their 
schools, jobs and the main shopping centres in Nelspruit. According to the local Federated Long 
and Local Distance Taxi Association, the ‘organisation [was] not invited to any decision-making 
meetings about the toll gates’.29 On the Mozambican side, there is a general perception that the 
projects associated with the MDC have caused shortages of water and electricity, and that the 
Maputo Corridor is simply a road in and out of Mozambique to be used by South Africans.30 
Having said that, it must be added that civil society has not always responded to invitations to 
negotiate the implications of the MDC, in particular the raising of tolls on formerly public roads. 
According to one Mozambican source, the government called meetings to discuss the MDC but 
a number of stakeholders did not bother to attend the meetings or came unprepared. These 
people (primarily entrepreneurs and local companies) now complain loudly at the impact of the 
MDC on their businesses.31 It is apparent that dialogue with civil society is a two-way process and 
more complicated than simply critiquing the state for a lack of engagement. For whatever reason, 
there seems to have been a lack of coherent local and regional linkages, or dissemination of 
knowledge about the SDI. One source asserted that these local interactions should have been 
established first, prior to the construction phase.32 With a very low level of Mozambican NGO 
activity vis-à-vis the MDC however, this is problematic.33 
At the same time, ‘Mpumalanga’s economic affairs department agrees that the small man [sic] 
has not always featured significantly in the Maputo Corridor planning’.34 This has led to a scenario 
where the MDC was recently described as ‘a major election issue in the small towns it straddles, 
with thousands of commuters accusing the government of crippling their economies by instituting 
the highest road toll fees in South Africa’.35 On the Mozambican side, a lack of participation by 
local communities in the toll road process lead to a loss of land with very little compensation and 
with no job creation, leading to opposition to the toll road.36  
It was also discovered that the role of investment promotion agencies at the provincial level 
was apparently being dismissed by senior DTI officials as being “barriers” to the fast track 
approach. In reality, the investment agencies, the Mpumalanga Investment Initiative (MII), were 
the main facilitators and first point of contact for prospective investors. Its functions were to 
disseminate information about the spatial area, provide a one-stop investor service, and market 
the MDC.37 However, at the time of interviewing, the Mpumalanga Investment Initiative had a 
                                                 
28 Jonathan Mitchell, 1998, p. 760. 
29 Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg) June 15, 1998. 
30 Interview with Dr Milissão Nvunga, lecturer at the Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionals, Maputo, April 7, 2000. 
31 Interview with Francisca Henriqueta Soares, transport economist, Mozambican Ministry of Transport and Communications, 
Maputo, April 10, 2000. 
32 Interview with David Arkwright, project manager, Maputo Corridor, Nelspruit, April 12, 2000. 
33 Interview with Dr Milissão Nvunga, lecturer at the Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionals, Maputo, April 7, 2000. 
34 Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg) June 15, 1998. 
35 Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), December 1-7, 2000. In informal interviews with local business people (Nelspruit, April 
3, 2000), it was clear that the siting of the toll plazas and the increase in costs was widely resented, particularly as no visible 
new investment (or perhaps business opportunities for the informants?) had apparently flowed into the area, as promised by the 
elaborate MDC prospectus.  
36 Interview with Dr Alfredo Namitete, Chairman, Committee of Senior Officials, Southern African Transport and 
Communications Commission, Maputo, April 6, 2000. 
Idctlpar 
37 Interview with Gordon Griffiths, Chief Executive Officer, Mpumalanga Investment Initiative, Nelspruit, April 4, 2000. 




staff of seven, funded by the provincial government. The MII offered free pre-feasibility studies 
and actively pursued liaison with other provincial investment agencies (such as Wesgro).38 
Bearing in mind that only one in one thousand telephone calls leads to investment,39 the low 
staffing levels at the MII was a cause of concern, although local business people were aware of, 
and approved of, the MIIs activities.40  
The sidelining of investment promotion agencies has the potential of seriously embarrassing not 
only local actors in contact with potential investors, but also the whole credibility of a SDI. In 
particular, the apparent lack of involvement of local investment agencies in preparing, identifying 
opportunities, even organising the international investment conference at the launch of the SDI 
process was highly problematic. Much of the “investment opportunities” proclaimed at certain 
conferences were “wish lists” of desired investment. In fact, some informants saw a number of the 
advertised projects at the investors’ conference as totally unworkable.41 The logic of putting up 
such wish lists without heavy involvement of local agencies (such as the MII) in checking and 
approving such input is obviously problematic. There is clearly a fundamental difference between 
“place marketing” (where attributes of an area are declared) and more substantive investment 
promotion where real and substantial investment opportunities are clearly identified and shown 
to investors.42  
According to the SADC Capital Projects Database, 32,529 million rand’s worth of funding has 
been identified, with 98 projects (of 117) receiving funding, along the MDC and there have been 
higher levels of investment into Mpumalanga. Sources both in Nelspruit and Maputo confirmed 
that there was somewhat of an investment boom in the area. However, constructing a direct 
causal link between raised levels of investment and the MDC SDI is problematic. Both 
Mpumalanga and Maputo Province are well located to receive investment anyway, particularly 
from Asia. Mpumalanga for instance has received substantial investment from Mainland China.43 
Mozambique is going through a (mostly donor-funded) reconstruction phase after the end of its 
civil war, as well as embarking on a liberalisation policy aimed at attracting foreign investors. This 
has nothing to do with the SDI. The MDC acts as a visible marketing device, demonstrating 
commitment to the region from the national and provincial, and the incentives provided can act 
as a stimulus. But latching onto raised levels of investment as evidence of the success of the MDC 
SDI per se is not particularly helpful, nor accurate.44  
3.4 Institutional arrangements 
The methodology of SDIs requires a competent and interested administration at the provincial 
level, particularly post-exit phase when devolution of responsibility to the provinces occurs. 
Unfortunately, there is considerable disquiet about the provincial leadership in Mpumalanga. The 
former provincial premier, Matthews Phosa, was widely seen as being a major political power 
supporting the MDC: ‘the youthful enthusiasm of the Mpumalanga leadership gave the Maputo 
Development Corridor such momentum that Mpumalanga became widely regarded as the 
country’s most progressive and promising province’.45 However, Phosa’s replacement has had a 
decidedly negative effect on the MDC, largely due to the activities of his successor, Ndaweni 
Mahlangu. According to one source, competence and support for the MDC declined massively 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Informal interviews with local business people, Nelspruit, April 3, 2000.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Amanda Driver, 1998, p. 6. 
43 Ibid. 
44 This point was made in an interview with Jonathan Mitchell, Economist, Special Projects and Policy Unit, Mpumalanga 
Province, Nelspruit April 5, 2000. 
45 The Mpumalanga Report, First Quarter, 1999, p. 2. 
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post-Phosa and there is now a lack of interest and vision in regional integration.46 The fact that the 
Mahlangu administration cancelled the technical unit in December 1999 exemplifies such 
disengagement by the province.47 
One source asserted that reinvestment in particular has been effected by the provincial 
administration’s suspect image.48 This has been a major problem, particularly as a strong and 
competent provincial involvement is needed in the MDC in order to deal with issues surrounding 
cross-border co-operation.49 The initiative to form the Borderland Commission to serve as a 
mechanism for project generation, capacity building and engaging with asymmetric conditions on 
the Mozambican side was a welcome step in this regard.50 However, overall, the behaviour and 
activities of a number of provincial politicians has not met acceptable standards of good 
governance. This, combined with low capacity at the provincial level in implementing policy has, 
and continues to threaten to, impact negatively on the MDC.51 
This is compounded by the general lack of formal institutionalisation and bureaucratic 
frameworks at the provincial level. It is apparent that there is no effective organisational entity to 
take on the obligations of a SDI post-DTI involvement, nor is there any real coherent manner by 
which the skills, lessons and style of working learnt during the planning and launching phase be 
passed onto local and provincial players who are expected to run with the project(s). Even 
relatively small things such as the concession agreement for the N4 toll road were withheld from 
the provinces by the national government.52 A Mozambican source confirmed this, asserting that 
the concession was ‘secret’ and not publicly available.53 This old-style form of top-down 
government clearly may cause a disjuncture in the smooth exit strategy envisioned by the SDI 
methodology. Certainly, it was found that the relationship between the national and provincial 
had broken down in many regards, for example the industrial development head had not met his 
counterparts in Pretoria for two years.54 A large number of informants on the ground in 
Mpumalanga asserted that this was due to the management style of leading DTI officials involved 
in the SDI programme, who had attempted to ride roughshod over the provincial level and had 
consequently impacted negatively on the relationship between national and provincial.  
Evidence existed that key personnel within the DTI had retreated from the position that 
promoting cluster projects was important and that advancing an active cluster process was 
necessary for success of the SDI.55 Indeed, the leveraging in of private sector investment through 
cluster strategies had apparently been rejected by influential individuals, even though clustering 
was not only within the overall SDI methodology, and in spite of the evidence elsewhere that 
cluster strategies have significant potential in promoting investment concentrations that had 
considerable linkages with the local community and hence stimulated growth and development.56  
                                                 
46 The identity of this interviewee is withheld, for obvious reasons.  
47 Interview with David Arkwright, project manager, Maputo Corridor, Nelspruit, April 12, 2000. 
48 Interview with Gordon Griffiths, Chief Executive Officer, Mpumalanga Investment Initiative, Nelspruit, April 4, 2000. 
49 Interview with David Arkwright, project manager, Maputo Corridor, Nelspruit, April 12, 2000. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Interview with Greg White, head of Private Sector Investments, Development Bank of Southern Africa, Halfway House, April 
14, 2000. 
52 Interview with Jonathan Mitchell, Economist, Special Projects and Policy Unit, Mpumalanga Province, Nelspruit April 5, 
2000. 
53 Interview with Dr Alfredo Namitete, Chairman, Committee of Senior Officials, Southern African Transport and 
Communications Commission, Maputo, April 6, 2000. 
54 Interview with David Arkwright, project manager, Maputo Corridor, Nelspruit, April 12, 2000. 
55 Ibid. 
56 There is a cluster process in the Highveld Ridge area that is based around activities generated by Sasol. The amount of 
employment and their sustainability however is open to question. The sugar-based initiatives in Nkomzi are apparently better in 
this regard - interview with Jonathan Mitchell, Economist, Special Projects and Policy Unit, Mpumalanga Province, Nelspruit 
April 5, 2000. On the success of clusters elsewhere in the developing world, see Dorothy McCormick ‘African Enterprise 




Not only this, but the apparent gap between the national and provincial level means that 
provincial officials may be reluctant to take on a project which has been driven by the DTI but 
one in which they have had little formal involvement until the handing over phase. Questions of 
ownership vis-à-vis an SDI may be provoked by such tensions, particularly as the projects were 
centralised rather than decentralised, by key personnel and decisions made at the DTI. Indeed, 
the “pet project” image given over by some DTI persons has meant that the MDC is seen as 
“someone else’s baby” as it were and thus there is a reluctance to take the project up by others.57 
This is particularly problematic in the case of the MDC where a strong provincial engagement is 
needed in order to deal with cross-border issues.58  
Although the political champion aspect of a SDI is generally viewed as positive, it does mean 
that particular onus is placed on capable political championship and a continuation after the exit 
stage by central government. However, the lack of institutionalisation and formal bureaucratic 
procedure means that much is placed on personal initiative and willingness to work across and 
between departments and other bodies. Clearly, SDIs are about promoting development and 
cannot be used as pet projects of individuals. Ad hoc forms of co-operation are vulnerable to the 
aforementioned problems, as well as the fact that such scenarios run counter to the SDI 
methodology by fostering effective centralisation, rather than the desired decentralisation.59 
Having said that, many informants asserted that capacity in implementing policy was very weak, 
particularly at the provincial level. How this can be overcome, without recourse to a reliance on 
strong and energetic individuals, is problematic, with no real short-term solution to this.60  
The project manager’s role within SDIs was found to be crucial, although in the MDC it was 
apparent that the project manager had not received the level and quality of support from the 
national that was required. Although seconded from the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
and funded from the SDI budget, it appeared that the project manager was frustrated at the lack 
of interaction between province and national levels of government. An ongoing thread that runs 
through the bureaucratic operations within the MDC was the perceived lack of capacity at the 
technical level.61 It was found that the highly capable project manager was operating within a 
milieu whereby provincial bureaucrats seemingly could not implement or carry through policy. In 
addition, the so-called Maputo Corridor Company that the manager headed was seriously 
hampered by the failure to incorporate it - it was thus ‘just a name, not even a legal entity’.62 This 
meant that the “Company” lacked any real clout, although it had managed to foster the original 
MDC vision and the SDI objectives, as well as perform concrete work in areas such as focusing 
on crucial areas, aid demonstration via ongoing projects, as well as procure resources and the co-
operation of both the public and private sector.63  
Nonetheless, the consequent dependence on one individual (the project manager) to energise 
the ongoing processes was replicated throughout the MDC, with key personnel committing huge 
amounts of time and energy in a situation where institutional back-up and help was limited and 
support and resources from the national was visibly limited. The serious problem with this is that 
the project manager is supposed to exit the SDI strategy and hand over to the technical unit - a 
                                                                                                                                            
Clusters and Industrialisation: Theory and Reality’, World Development, vol. 27, no. 9, 1999; and Tilman Altenburg ‘How to 
Promote Clusters: Policy Experiences from Latin America’, World Development, vol 27, no. 9, 1999. 
57 The identity of this interviewee was withheld, upon request. 
58 Interview with David Arkwright, project manager, Maputo Corridor, Nelspruit, April 12, 2000. 
59 Fredrik Söderbaum, 2000. 
60 Interview with Greg White, head of Private Sector Investments, Development Bank of Southern Africa, Halfway House, April 
14, 2000. 
61 Interview with David Arkwright, project manager, Maputo Corridor, Nelspruit, April 12, 2000. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Local Mozambican interests had seemingly objected to the Maputo Corridor Company’s incorporation due to concerns vis-à-
vis committing themselves to involvement in a limited commercial company. These concerns were largely politically in origin - 
interview with David Arkwright, project manager, Maputo Corridor, Nelspruit, April 12, 2000.  
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unit that in Mpumalanga was disbanded by the Mahlangu administration and in Mozambique has 
barely been existent. Compounding this, the lack of political leadership, on both the Mozambican 
and South African side, was identified as extremely problematic. In addition, capacity problems 
were identified time and again. What perhaps could be a solution would be to rely on the private 
sector as actual implementers, with the state playing a facilitating role and regulatory oversight 
being provided by the public sector, particularly at the municipal level.64 The involvement of the 
donor community in helping to build administrative capacity within SDIs may be one way 
forward in the medium- to long-term. 
                                                 
64 Interview with Greg White, head of Private Sector Investments, Development Bank of Southern Africa, Halfway House, April 
14, 2000. 




4. The West Coast Investment Initiative 
4.1 Introduction 
The mini-mill of Saldanha Steel was identified as the anchor project for the West Coast 
Investment Initiative.65 The Saldanha Steel plant offers possibilities for linked and related 
industries. In addition, the under-exploited scope for development in agriculture, tourism and 
fishing in the region makes the siting of an SDI attractive. The spatial area possesses a significant 
resource base, satisfactory infrastructure and a broader social and natural environment, which 
presents attractive opportunities to investors. It is important to note that, relatively speaking, the 
West Coast was not a neglected/poor region and possessed good infrastructure, especially roads, 
before the launch of the WCII.66 
Special investor-friendly packages have been introduced, focusing on non-fiscal incentives and 
institutional support to improve the space’s pulling power vis-à-vis new investments. The February 
1998 Investors Conference tabled 120 potential projects within the boundaries of the West Coast 
region. As of June 2000 the SDI website indicated that 20 of these projects could be considered 
operational, with a further 9 either approved or under construction, leaving 77 either at the 
scoping or pre-feasibility stage. Approximately 17 percent of projects are therefore operational, a 
figure which compares well to other SDIs. These operational projects represent approximately US 
$2 billion of investment and are estimated to create between 1944 and 4845.5 direct jobs. 67   In 
an assessment of the WCII, and SDIs in general, an important question centres on when a project 
is regarded as SDI-induced and when not?  Furthermore over what time period does one assess 
SDI-generated investment projects?  These are important questions to consider in so far as they 
reflect investor concerns related to spatial risk/return factors and the impact of demonstration 
effects which may take considerable time to provide the required trigger to local and perhaps 
more importantly, foreign direct investment. 
According to the SDI website WCII is made up of the following actual and potential project 
areas:68  
• Mineral beneficiation 16 projects (4)69, largely export oriented. 
• Possible new mineral and industrial processing projects 4 projects, largely export oriented. 
• Existing or approved mineral processing projects 5 projects (3), largely export. 
• Possible mineral processing projects 12 projects, some South African market, some export 
market. 
• Existing or approved metal processing projects 12 projects (1), largely export, some for 
South African market. 
                                                 
65 “Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) – the official view”, Paul Jourdan, Development Southern Africa 1998, 15,5. “SDIs: 
Infrastructure, agglomeration and the region in industrial policy”, David Lewis and Robin Bloch, Development Southern Africa 
1998 15, 5.  
66 Interview with Wolfgang Thomas, chief economist, Wesgro, Cape Town 4, 2000. 
67 www.sdi.org.za. 
68 Project list taken from March 1999 WCII project database, some projects listed here are further subdivided into smaller 
projects, hence explaining the discrepancy between the number of projects listed here (95) and the 120 presented at the Investors 
Conference.  
69 Figures in brackets represent the number of projects that are classified as ‘operational’ within each of these categories 
according to the SDI website as of June 2000. 
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• Potential agricultural processing projects 13 projects (4), mix of South African and export 
markets. 
• Fishing and mariculture 7 projects, mix of South African and export markets. 
• Tourism 19 projects (7), aimed at domestic and international markets. 
•  Potential infrastructural projects 7 projects (1). 
4.2 Methodology employed in the WCII 
Following the broader SDI methodology, a process of project scoping was initiated and the 
identification of potential projects was carried out. An initial conceptual workshop was held in 
May 1997, the object being to inform people that an SDI had been proclaimed in the West Coast 
and to include key actors in identifying the opportunities and constraints to investment in the 
region.70 Working groups were subsequently established to examine opportunities in each of the 
nominated economic sectors and within key supporting sectors such as education. A Provincial 
Inter Ministerial Committee was set up to ensure communication between the Project Manager 
and key Provincial Departments. The official investors conference was held in February 1998.71  
The conference was deemed a success in terms of attendance and benefited from the presence 
of Nelson Mandela. Work had been carried out in the working groups to identify bankable 
projects and to effectively produce viable business plans so that private sector investors could 
quickly and easily evaluate the projects. However, it has to be said that several respondents 
indicated that the projects listed (however thoroughly researched and packaged) appeared to be 
a “wish list” which at best would take a long time to deliver.72 The international markets for trade 
and investment, upon which these projects depend, are at present fickle and have tended to 
bypass the African continent. This has influenced the take-up rate of a number of the tabled 
projects.  
 In addition, according to one source, a number of the projects tabled at the conference were 
‘simply not feasible’.73 One source later claimed that such advertised projects were not ones that 
‘would happen’. Rather, they were ‘only announced opportunities and those that were already up 
and running…the more innovative and new projects are still in the pipeline and subject to further 
research’.74 Three years after the investors’ conference, these ‘innovative and new projects’ are 
starting to emerge from the pipeline75. The low levels of investment have subsequently been 
blamed on the Asian crisis. Although the project identification process was externally driven, 
through the IDC, WCII and consultants, some degree of local consultation did take place. This 
however was limited by a need to bypass local elite interests - apparently the area is dominated 
by a few elite families who own many of the businesses.   
Interestingly, from the outset there was much resistance at the provincial level (from the 
National Party) to the leadership of Paul Jourdan, who was identified as being close to the ANC. 
One source claimed that ‘the stakeholders were relatively unsophisticated and politics in the area 
                                                 
70 Anonymous source.  
71 Electronic correspondence with Laurine Platzky, Deputy Director-General, Business Promotion, Department of Economic 
Affairs, Agriculture and Tourism, Western Cape, January 2, 2001. 
72 Sources include officials within Provincial and Local level organisations.  
73 Interview with Wolfgang Thomas, chief economist, Wesgro, Cape Town, January 4, 2000. 
74 Electronic correspondence with Laurine Platzky, Deputy Director-General, Business Promotion, Department of Economic 
Affairs, Agriculture and Tourism, Western Cape, January 2, 2001. 
75 A number of these projects are nearing the point of operation 




[was] difficult (one side thinks anything from national is good, the other side is suspicious)’.76 The 
fact that the methodology was being imposed from the National level was also resented. Hence 
the project became known as the West Coast Investment Initiative rather than an SDI.77 The 
complexities of party politics were to hinder the early days of WCII’s development in a number of 
ways. For example, research conducted in 1998 revealed that Provincial level actors within the 
National Party were strongly opposed to WCII; interestingly their sentiments were diametrically 
opposed to those of supporters within the West Coast who showed a great willingness to co-
operate for the betterment of the local economy.78   
4.3 Over-selling problems 
When SDI’s were announced nationally in 1995, investment, trade and jobs were promised. The 
launch of each individual SDI has equally been heralded with grandiose claims concerning the 
ability of each scheme to generate significant local economic growth. The anchor projects in 
particular have tended to receive ringing endorsements from politicians and technocrats in all 
spheres of governments. A result has been that expectations have become overblown. For 
instance it was claimed that ‘SDIs are aimed specifically at boosting employment and Black 
empowerment’.79 These types of claims leave the SDI projects open to serious and critical 
interrogation, as well as negative conclusions.   
For instance, the employment and down-streaming capacity of Saldanha Steel has been 
exaggerated in the local media. One report claimed that ‘on completion some 6,000 people will 
be employed permanently at the factory’, whilst Saldanha Steel ‘is expected to generate R1 billion 
of contract work over a two year period.80 Furthermore, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcula Deputy DTI 
Minister claimed that ‘the West Coast region could attract…very conservatively put, investment of 
about R10 billion’.81 In contrast, an official on the ground later claimed that ‘we kept it low-key 
with few promises’.82 Whatever the intention, a number of negative consequences have resulted: 
• Increased in-migration to the localities of mega projects has been generated creating tensions 
with locals, complicating the process of meeting local labour quotas and in the case of 
Saldanha/Vredenberg, actually increasing the long-term unemployment rate.  
• The nature of jobs created has also lead to complications, as expectations have not been 
met. The West Coast population has had minimal prior exposure to the modern flexible 
economy and its characteristics of short-term contracts and sub-contracting. Much 
resentment was generated at Saldanha Steel in the final stages of construction when workers 
learned they would soon no longer be required. Saldanha Steel itself bore the brunt of 
worker anger as small-scale riots and vandalism occurred. Production was stopped for several 
days and damage costs ran to 5 million rand.83 
• Disillusionment and resentment sets in amongst the local population who perceive that 
governments do not deliver on their promises with a resultant degeneration in respect for the 
democratic process.  
                                                 
76 Electronic correspondence with Laurine Platzky, Deputy Director-General, Business Promotion, Department of Economic 
Affairs, Agriculture and Tourism, Western Cape, January 2, 2001. 
77 Interview with Wolfgang Thomas, chief economist, Wesgro, Cape Town, January 4, 2000. 
78 Source has requested anonymity.  
79 Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), September 18, 1998 
80 Cape Argus (Cape Town) October 18, 1997.   
81 Quoted in Cape Times (Cape Town) November 13, 1997. 
82 Electronic correspondence with Laurine Platzky, Deputy Director-General, Business Promotion, Department of Economic 
Affairs, Agriculture and Tourism, Western Cape, January 2, 2001. 
83 Saldanha Steel Gazette May 1998. 
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Job creation was initially touted as one of the main aims of the SDI programme along with 
investment, Black empowerment, export orientation and better utilisation of infrastructure and 
resources. Experience has shown that these aims have not enjoyed equal weighting in the minds 
of SDI planners and managers. A senior SDI manager indicated that SDIs are about investment 
first and foremost rather than jobs or even spatial development per se. An imperative to attract 
investment internationally and locally can be understood in light of the nation’s poor FDI record 
in the post-apartheid years. Many external observers and South African policy-makers had 
expected that the ending of apartheid offered an unparalleled opportunity to open the floodgates 
of pent-up investment flows.84  However international financial flows have become increasingly 
embedded within certain channels, namely between and within the triad of Europe, North 
America and South East Asia.85 Recent investments into South Africa have tended to be more 
speculative in nature through public utilities privatisations rather than longer-term investments.86 
The SDI programme can be understood as a major strategy seeking to locate South Africa within 
the map of international investment flows. Such an outward-orientation is also consistent with 
GEAR, which was in the process of formulation at the time the SDI programme was announced87.   
4.4 Development through anchor projects? 
The Saldanha Steel project is the main anchor project of the WCII. Environmental factors 
significantly influenced the siting and technology of the plant, as local pressure groups exerted 
considerable pressure. The designation of the nearby Langebaan lagoon as a protected reserve 
has encouraged the building of a “green” steel plant, and it is estimated that environmentally 
friendly technology has added about 10 percent to the production costs.88 Although this project 
was in existence before the WCII, the WCII can be credited with adding impetus to the project 
and raising its profile on both the international and domestic stages.  
Approximately 6,300 people were employed directly during the construction phase. A Wesgro 
research report published in 1998 indicated that approximately 45 percent of the construction 
jobs were taken up by people deemed to be local, 20 percent came from other areas of the 
Western Cape and 35 percent from the rest of South Africa. A proportion of the jobs required 
specific or higher skills and was awarded to people from beyond the West Coast. Thus 
employees from the rest of South Africa tended to earn higher wages.89  
Contracts to the value of R2 billion were awarded during construction. West Coast contractors 
represented 31 percent of the total contracts awarded, thus more than 40 percent of the benefits 
were felt beyond the Western Cape. A similar pattern can be applied to supplies. HDIFs benefited 
to the tune of R121.7 million nationally of which only 8 percent (R10 million) was concentrated in 
the West Coast. During the construction phase 10,130 jobs were created locally and 72 new 
firms came into existence in the West Coast. The role played by the domestic policy environment 
is perhaps more important in this regard. 
Once the project was completed however, employment at the Saldanha steelworks fell abruptly 
as the plant operates with a fully trained staff of 600 people. Due to the highly technical nature of 
much of the plant, minimum qualifications levels were set at Matric-level Maths and Science. Two 
                                                 
84 Communication with IDC representatives, April 2001.  
85 Unctad 1999 “World Investment Report”, P.Hirst and G. Thompson, 1996 “Globalisation in Question”.  
86 H. Marais 2001 “South Africa, Limits to Change.” 
87 The Asian crisis has been mentioned as a critical factor explaining the inability to attract FDI.  
88 Interview with Pieter Pistorious, Saldanha Steel engineer.  In spite of these added environmental costs, Saldanha Steels output 
is on the lowest price quartile on world markets. In addition the environmentally friendly design reduces the potential negative 
impacts of the plant on the areas nascent tourist industry.  
89 ‘The Economic Impact of the Saldanha Steel Project 1996-1998’, Wesgro 1998 and ‘Saldanha Steel: Economic Impact Study’, 
Saldanha Steel factsheet. 




thirds of the workforce was recruited locally with the vast majority of the recruits having little or 
no previous work experience of any type (let alone involvement in steel manufacturing). Training 
was therefore crucial to the long-term success of the plant. Recruits were granted bursaries 
enabling them to spend time at other steel plants in South Africa and beyond. The male-female 
ratio of employees is 11:1 and by November 1999, the percentage of non-White staff was 52 
percent.90  
Saldanha Steel operates a policy of 100 percent outsourcing and therefore employs no staff 
beyond the requirement for direct steel production. Such a system enables Saldanha Steel and 
other local corporates to maintain low operating costs, and it can be argued that this permits the 
development of entrepreneurial skills within the local community: catering, cleaning and security 
services are all performed by West Coast-based companies. A lack of entrepreneurial skills and 
capacity remains a problem however. The issue of outsourcing is highly complex and emotive. 
Whilst the process provides considerable new business opportunities it is necessary to note that 
levels of remuneration, job security and general working conditions are often far from ideal in the 
eyes of some critics.   In total, the operating phase of Saldanha Steel has been credited with 
creating 1,300 jobs within the Saldanha cluster, 550 in the public sector and 5, 000 in other firms. 
Questions have to be asked about whether such mega-projects can be justified when 
scrutinised from other angles:  
Of the R7.1 billion, and after discounting expenditure on foreign specialised 
technology and equipment, start-up costs, land and financing cost, and 
design, management, materials and construction purchases in South Africa as 
well as specialised equipment and technology which could only be 
procured in Gauteng, about R2 billion was available for expenditure in the 
Western Cape, including the West Coast sub-region.91 
 ‘It could be argued that the R8 billion investment into a full-time staff complement of 600 
employees hardly justifies all the effort’.92 This goes to the heart of debates relating to the validity 
of mega-projects as engines of growth in contemporary developing economies.  
Having said that, a number of industries down-stream do benefit from Saldanha Steel. Duferco, 
a Swiss owned company have invested US$180 million in a plant, which processes a proportion 
of Saldanha Steel’s hot rolled steel. This has created 220 jobs and has the potential to produce 
exports of US$ 200 million a year producing cold rolled steel coil, including galvanised. Namakwa 
Sands has been extended producing titanium slag, Zircon, and Rutile. Investments in this equalled 
US$ 350 million, employment is 333 and the export potential is US$ 125 million. Portland 
Pretoria Cement (PPC) produces granulated iron, coal fines, COREX sludge, with an investment of 
US$30 million. Employment generated is 40, operating on a 15-year contract with Saldanha Steel. 
Finally, Slag Reduction, electric arc slag with an investment of US$ 10 million, created 60 jobs on 
long-term contract with Saldanha Steel. All these, of course, have benefited the local economy. 
Big-bang projects, such as Saldanha Steel, are renowned internationally for producing a 
localised “boom and bust” scenario. It is evident that such an approach is premised on a number 
of assumptions about the local socio-economic context, national and international investment 
markets and the available resources. A crucial lesson is that time frames need to be devised in 
accordance with local circumstances, otherwise severe disjunctures result between needs and 
resources. For example the sequencing of WCII phasing, and the integration process in particular, 
                                                 
90 Saldanha Steel has set targets such that by the third quarter of 2003 Black staff will represent 58% of the total workforce. It is 
predicted that Whites will still dominate the managerial and specialist categories, although the gap will be closing rapidly as 
promotions within the ranks takes place. Source: ‘Update’, September 2000, Saldanha Steel circular.  
91‘Saldanha Steel: Economic Impact Study’, Saldanha Steel factsheet. 
92 ‘The Economic Impact of the Saldanha Steel Project 1996-1998’, Wesgro 1998, p2. 
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has borne little relationship to the economic cycles associated with the construction of the 
Saldanha Steel plant. During the construction phase many thousands of people gained work 
possibly for the first time, in the local area. As a result the area became symptomatic of a 
boomtown; people migrate to the area in search of work, property values climb, existing 
businesses prosper and new businesses start up. However, the end of the construction phase and 
the rapid transition to the operational stage, employing 600 people, opens a Pandora’s box of 
problems. In the case of Saldanha Steel, the rapid scaling down of employment came as a 
surprise to many. Unemployment in the Saldanha/Vredenberg area soared, reaching levels higher 
than in the period prior to the construction due to in-migration. Businesses have faltered and 
many have become bankrupt - 46 in the first three months of 2000 alone.93 Problems such as 
homelessness, begging and crime have increased. At a time of economic contraction and 
retrenchment (which one could argue was highly predictable)94 it might be reasonable to expect 
that WCII and associated public sector institutions would have measures in place to soften the 
negative impacts in the immediate post-construction phase and be intensifying their efforts to 
stimulate economic activity in the area. However at this time WCII was in the final stages of 
integration. Something of a hiatus thus occurred as local and provincial actors sought to 
familiarise themselves with new responsibilities and institutional arrangements. Some actors and 
institutions were better equipped for this than others.   
4.5 Role of previously disadvantaged communities 
A case can be made that the construction phases of Saldanha Steel provided a major stimulus to 
the local economy. However questions can be raised about the extent of delivery of benefits to 
previously disadvantaged people and indeed the benefits attained in the West Coast compared to 
the Western Cape and South Africa as a whole. The construction phase directly created 6400 
jobs of which less than half went to West Coast inhabitants. However it is not possible to record 
the number of jobs taken up by previously disadvantaged communities.95 This lack of data is a 
little puzzling, as one would assume that major construction companies would keep some form 
of employee records. In addition one might surmise therefore that firms were under no obligation 
to meet any form of quota targets for equitable employment. In the context of South Africa’s 
massive racially delineated social inequalities and the Black economic empowerment aims of SDI 
such an absence of employment monitoring is a cause for concern.  
Physical construction, management and design contracts to the value of R20 million were made 
available to historically disadvantaged people. In the twenty-two months before May 1998, 
R736.8 million were spent nationally by Saldanha Steel on service supply contracts of which R41 
million were supplied by historically disadvantaged people. A Saldanha Steel fact sheet records 
that nationally HDIFs benefited in total by R121.7 million – 5 percent of the expenditure of South 
Africa during the construction phase. West Coast HDIFs benefited by about R10 million.96  
In 1998 the West Coast benefited from R12 million of sub contracts out of a total sub contracts 
of R22.7 million. HDIFs and SMMEs gained R2.2m of this spending. The main services provided 
by HDIFs were as follows: commercial cleaning, laundry services, catering, industrial cleaning, 
                                                 
93 Interview with Trudy Mills, Centre Manager WCBDC, October 3, 2000.  
94 See foreword by Wolfgang Thomas in Wesgro 1998 ‘The Economic Impact of the Saldanha Steel Project 1996-1998.’ Also 
interview with Danie Barnado, Chair of Saldanha Chamber of Commerce, 2nd October 2000.  
95 ‘(T)he source (geographic area) and quality of the labour supply. Information on the distribution of the labour force in terms 
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internal audit, stationary supplies and outbound logistical management. By 1999 the extent of 
HDIF benefit had risen to R2.94m.97 
The local procurement process has not been without controversy and WESGRO researchers 
noted the following problems:  
• Communication with tender applicants was poor and not always transparent. 
• Reasons for tender failure were not made known. 
• Tender allocation was perceived to be unfair and entrenched mainstream business. 
• Advice and support on tender preparation was either absent or not readily available. 
• Saldanha Steel appeared to have capacity problems dealing with the particular requirements 
of HDIFs.  
The researchers conclude that ‘Saldanha Steel underestimated the resources needed to ensure 
that (local) HDIFs substantially benefit more from the construction and operations. This implies 
more human resources, time and money and other support has to be allocated to small business 
support to optimise the factory’s impact on HDIF empowerment’.98 The ramifications of these 
conclusions are considerable and should be noted for future major project investments. It appears 
that considerable groundwork should be done to prepare the local community. Questions need 
to be answered as to whose responsibility it is to do such preparatory work: the local business 
sector? The public sector? If the latter, which sphere should take the lead role? A public/private 
partnership arrangement? If so, under what institutional arrangements?  Respondents indicated 
that Saldanha Steel has continued to review its systems and has made considerable progress in 
improving the character of its interactions with local sub-contractors.99 The relationship between 
Saldanha Steel and the West Coast Business Development Centre has facilitated this process.   
4.6 Down-streaming levels 
Down-streaming impacts of Saldanha Steel have been limited to date, with the majority of steel 
being exported overseas. A small percentage is further processed locally: one third of Saldanha 
Steel is to be sold to Duferco, a down-stream cold rolling facility located on an adjacent site, with 
the balance being targeted at global markets. South Africa benefits from the foreign exchange 
earned through exports, however manufacturers in other countries are able to benefit 
considerably from the value added by further processing into more expensive products. From a 
national perspective there is a strong case for developing a range of localised down-streaming 
activities producing more valuable output. Saldanha Steel appointed a Business Development 
Manager in 1997 to investigate opportunities for domestic linkages in the Saldanha area.100 
From a business perspective a more diversified market offers protection against vacillations in 
international steel markets, whilst at the same time improving the local business environment. 
Saldanha Steel has set the following objectives:  
• To create 20,000 jobs through outsourcing and new business creation in the next decade.  
• To establish an effective and viable local supplier base.  
                                                 
97 Ibid. 
98 ‘The Economic Impact of the Saldanha Steel Project 1996-1998’, WESGRO 1998 p.32. 
99 Interviews with businesses in Saldanha/ Bay area and with staff at West Coast Business Development Centre, April 2001 
100 ‘Saldanha Steel and Growing Business in the West Coast – 1997/98’, Saldanha Steel circular April 2000. 
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• To contribute towards the development of local technical and entrepreneurial skills.  
• To promote a cluster of internationally competitive enterprises in the region.101 
In order to meet these objectives it is important to investigate the mechanisms that are required 
to stimulate local businesses of this genre. Saldanha Steel’s Business Development Manager 
undertook a study trip to India, China and East Africa in April 2000 in order to investigate the 
potential for local processing. A report on the trip records that vibrant, small scale, labour-
intensive steel operations exist in all these countries. There is scope for investigating how these 
operations can be replicated in the Saldanha area. South Africa’s progressive labour and health 
and safety laws may however act as a barrier to the development of such industries. Serious and 
informed debate is required on this issue. It is important to note that the down-streaming issue is 
highly complex as the industrial development needs of the Saldanha Bay area are directly affected 
by the business decisions of Saldanha Steels owners - the IDC and Iscor. Local businessmen 
report that obtaining locally produced steel for further processing is, at present, a difficult 
process.102 Whilst substantial claims have been made about the potential for down-stream activity, 
some observers believe that releasing substantial quantities of steel onto the local market was 
never part of the Saldanha Steel business strategy.103  
4.6.1 Evaluating the anchor project 
Great care needs to be taken when judging the success of Saldanha Steel. The project can be 
evaluated from a number of perspectives. From the narrowest perspective, Saldanha Steel can be 
evaluated on its terms as a viable business. Production and sales statistics indicate that the 
company is proceeding satisfactorily.104 As a catalyst for regional economic development, results 
to date are more mixed. There have been considerable short- and medium-term benefits to the 
Saldanha-Vredenburg area. In terms of reach into previously disadvantaged communities 
however, the outcomes are more questionable. A relatively small proportion of new business 
activity has been generated amongst the Coloured and Black communities who jointly represent 
the largest component of the local population. The discredited trickle-down effect has been over-
relied upon to deliver benefits within these communities. 
Recent Saldanha Steel literature indicates a desire to tackle the weaknesses in the future. 
Saldanha Steel should be held accountable for a proportion of these problems, such as non-
reporting back on weaknesses in tender application/reasons for rejection of procurement bids. 
However other issues relate more to the broader environment, which mitigated against high take-
up of business opportunities by West Coast based disadvantaged contractors. Necessary 
institutional development required to this process did not come on-stream until late in the 
process. The early efforts of WCII were focused on identifying major investment opportunities for 
the Investor Conference rather than upon building capacity in local communities.105 It can be 
argued that such sequencing has held the situation back. 
For Saldanha Steel to be judged a success as an economic catalyst in the long-term will depend 
upon the ability to engender the creation of local down-streaming steel processing activities. It is 
clearly too early to judge whether the project is a “success” or a “failure”, as much of this will 
depend upon the degree to which down-streaming occurs in the future and thus the extent to 
which growth becomes embedded in the locality. If the company’s target of stimulating 20,000 
jobs comes to fruition within the ten-year time frame then Saldanha Steel may well attain the 
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status of an international good practice case study. The attempt by Saldanha Steel to conduct 
research into the potential offered by down-streaming through local small businesses is also highly 
positive. For this target to be met then, significant investments will be needed from all spheres of 
government to facilitate the appropriate legislative and institutional environment to develop. 
Policy based around getting the macro-economics right will not be sufficient; a number of micro-
economic policies and support strategies will need to be enacted ranging from reviews of labour 
legislation to micro-finance initiatives.   
4.7 Beyond the Anchor Project and the Saldanha Cluster… 
In contrast to the Saldanha Cluster, other WCII projects have tended to be considerably smaller in 
scale and reflect a substantial switch in emphasis after the failure of the 1998 Investors 
Conference to attract significant external investment. Henceforth more locally based and locally 
funded projects have emerged.106 These include: 
• Paternoster Cultural Heritage Tourism Development Paternoster is a small attractive fishing 
village, 15 kilometres from Vredenburg. A fresh fish market and village bakery are to be 
developed as the centrepiece of a broader tourism based project. The complexities of such 
programmes are evident in the plans to get these projects off the ground; an initial tourism 
appraisal and marketing study was carried out, a local Community Tourism Committee was 
established. Funding was sought through widespread lobbying: R500, 000 grant from 
National Poverty Funding, the WCPDC TLC contributed R150, 000 and the local community, 
R15, 000. In addition the National Business Initiative (NBI) have been consulted and 
Chittenden Nicks produced a development plan. The June 2000 WCII Integration document 
lists no less than 11 agencies that will be involved in the delivery of the project. This example 
illustrates that a formidable amount of co-ordination, lobbying and negotiation is required for 
a single, relatively small project to become operational.107 The archaeological heritage of the 
area is to be tapped through the development of a Paternoster “archaeo-tourism” hiking trail. 
Should Paternoster become successfully integrated into the West Coast tourism circuit (a 
process that will be greatly facilitated by the recent tarring of the only road into the village) 
then considerable benefits may be felt by this small isolated community.108 It has been noted 
that considerable lessons about the nature of community based Local Economic 
Development plans have been learned by key actors during the development for this 
project.109 As a result future efforts within the Province will benefit from a more streamlined 
approach. 
• Lamberts Bay Waterfront Development The extraordinarily rich avarian resources of 
Lamberts Bay have led to the creation of Bird Island. R400, 000 was made available in 1998 
to construct a link to the island along with a bird hide. The facility already attracts some 
tourists despite the infrastructural constraints of the area. It is intended to further develop the 
potential of the area through the construction of a Waterfront Development, including 
restaurants and a retail park. An initial public-private partnership (PPP) initiative failed to 
attract significant interest, a relaunch of the plan is ongoing. Monies have been made 
available from national and provincial government to pump prime the area such that it may 
prove more attractive for private investment. The project has been described as being “all 
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107 Interview with representative from National Business Initiative March 2000. 
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about local economic development with all three spheres of government cooperating for the 
first time to deliver.”110 
• Mariculture Project (Seaweed), St Helena Bay An initial investor (from Norway) was 
identified to contribute in partnership with a group of community based entrepreneurs for the 
development of seaweed production for export. However “Norway pulled out in November 
2000 as the SA water quality standards are too high for them.”111 
• Moorreesburg regional craft centre/ living heritage centre (Tiger Oats) The Tiger Oats 
company have made a historic building available for the development of a regional heritage 
centre which will be a “nodal point” within the wider West Coast tourism product range.  
4.8 Capacity-building 
Just as in the MDC, capacity constraints have posed significant challenges. Various bodies have 
been set up, such as the West Coast Business Development Centre (WCBDC) to serve specific 
practical purposes through direct contact with businesses and potential entrepreneurs. Others 
such as the LED forum act to bring local role players together to devise ways forward. WCII has 
supported such developments through rhetoric, finance and human resources. Individual WCII 
employees have been instrumental in driving the LED forum during the WCII exit phase.112 The 
importance of energetic, focused, driven individuals cannot be underplayed.  
In addition, an Education, Training and Employment (ETE) working group was established 
composed of representatives from the provincial departments of labour and education, education 
service providers and organised labour. The West Coast has traditionally been hampered by a 
lack of local tertiary education. All three of the provinces universities are situated in or very near 
to Cape Town: the University of Cape Town, the University of Stellenbosch, and the University of 
the Western Cape. There is a branch campus of the University of Stellenbosch in Saldanha, but 
this is limited purely to military personnel at the Military Academy there.113 As a result, young 
people with ability and ambition have been compelled to leave the area both to further their 
education and to gain employment opportunities commensurate with their qualifications. There is 
thus is no meaningful pool of local skilled labour to supply the work force for many projects or 
indeed to act as forward thinking entrepreneurs. It has therefore been WCII policy to lobby for 
the improvement to the educational infrastructure available to the West Coast population.  
The function of the ETE body is to ensure that coherent planning and investment takes place in 
the local education system such that young people with appropriate skills enter the workforce. 
Important outcomes to date include the preparation of a detailed skills audit of industrial and non-
industrial sectors of the West Coast.114 Science and maths have been identified as core subjects 
leading to a number of industry school projects. These capacity-building projects at the grass-
roots level are widely seen as positive. 
 A school career choice programme is also in progress aiming to both increase young peoples’ 
awareness of possible future opportunities, and also to act as a motivating tool. Most significantly 
a West Coast College has been “proclaimed” by the Department of Education.115 This 
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programme will be facilitated by expansion of the Work Experience Programme being co-
ordinated by Starfish 2000 within the Western Cape as a whole.116 
 Such programmes will have little short-term beneficial effect upon the local economy, however 
they provide the bedrock foundations upon which future growth will depend. WCII’s facilitative 
role has been pivotal to the creation of these schemes. The ability of a single agency to take a 
regional perspective and pull together key actors in an unpoliticised manner is essential to the 
success of such programmes. In addition mind set changing within the institutions of the West 
Coast has been integral to the process from the very inception of WCII. One former WCII 
employee commented that “there have been serious dividends on the process side.”117 
4.9 Business support services 
The creation of business development centres is a crucial step in facilitating small business growth 
in a region. The WCBDC is judged by some external observers as being very successful.118 The 
centre has acted as a crucial nexus between the corporate organisations of Saldanha Bay’s 
industrial and fishing clusters and the embryonic SME sectors. Representatives from successful 
local SMEs have consistently stressed the importance of the WCBDC in enabling them to access 
relevant training, finance and specific business advice.119 However it is apparent that inadequate 
resourcing is causing a number of constraints affecting both the delivery of services and staff 
morale.120 The centres rely on a variety of sources of funding such as Ntsika, DTI, Local Authority, 
Corporate subscriptions and SMME subscriptions. However some sources are unreliable in 
making regular payments and in addition total levels of income are not really sufficient to retain 
staff or to provide a full range of services. For example, the WCBDC does not have access to a 
designated car – an incredible state of affairs in a rural area. One source admitted that the ‘long-
term skills and infrastructure [projects] work on very low budgets’.121 
4.9.1 Financing of development initiatives 
The SDI methodology focuses upon the need for rapid action to facilitate investment, by cutting 
red tape, or creating bureaucratic freeways. Activities that identify and rectify key blockages have 
been central to the SDI process in WCII. In reality WCII has been in a position to lobby directly 
for the removal of some obstructions to investment, whilst others are rooted in structures beyond 
WCII’s immediate control or influence. Lipton has noted that “…despite the rhetoric there is 
continuing ambivalence and even hostility towards SMEs in South Africa.”122 Such attitudes have 
been prevalent within key national level institutions involved in the delivery of SDI. The 
implication being that SMEs are poorly motivated and expect opportunities to be handed on a 
plate.  Whilst recognising that cultures of entitlement are part of the story in areas such as the 
West Coast, the realities of life for enthusiastic prospective entrepreneurs from previously 
disadvantaged backgrounds are poorly represented by such glib statements. A number of 
significant barriers exist which prevent people from entering the market place.  
Raising finance for small-scale entrepreneurial activities has proven particularly problematic. 
There are channels through which potential entrepreneurs can apply for the seed capital required 
to operationalise their ideas. However the playing field is less than level and a number of 
constraints come into play, disproportionately limiting the ambitions of small-scale entrepreneurs 
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from historically disadvantaged backgrounds. Formal free market mechanisms for attracting 
finance exist through the main banks. However the lending policies of these organisations 
effectively preclude any form of lending which may be perceived as risky.123 Potential 
entrepreneurs from HDI backgrounds usually lack a personal track record, collateral and may well 
live within areas “red-lined” by banks. In rural areas, such as the majority of WCII, physical 
distance from a key lending facility is a significant problem as transport links are expensive and 
infrequent. Ultimately banks which are competing in first world international capital markets are 
unlikely to provide for the needs of the majority of the population in nations such as South Africa. 
Unfortunately alternative financial organisations such as Khula have not provided a solution 
either. A combination of overly complex application procedures, very slow turn around of 
applications, low acceptance rates and urban bias all hinder the progress of local entrepreneurs 
within WCII. Turn around rates of six months does not sit easily with fast track investment ideals. 
Equally the setting of targets of 40 percent success rate for small business lending is quite 
unrealistic. A longer-term view of business start-ups is required whereby the success or failure of 
an individual business is less of an issue than the benefit of experience that will have been earned.   
A number of respondents within local and provincial government and within local organisations 
expressed extreme frustration at the problems associated with capital access for budding 
entrepreneurs. Injection of such funds would not only stimulate business but would also produce 
small-scale economic multiplier effects whilst providing much needed business experience which 
will pay long-term dividends. In April 2000 the WCBDC assisted in the production of 22 
applications for funding from a national agency. However, no replies had been received by 
October 2000.124 The slowness of turnaround is a major problem for several reasons: 
• Leaves the applicant in an uncertain position with relation to other potential employment 
opportunities.  
• The optimum moment for start-up in relation to local market conditions may be missed. 
• The applicant may remain in poverty for longer than is necessary. 
• Anger and resentment may develop.  
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5. Reflections on the Broader SDI Methodology 
5.1 The Involvement of Communities and the nature of Consultation 
The methodology of SDI has involved a significant departure from the vision presented by the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP ‘…seeks to mobilise all our people 
and all our country’s resources towards the final eradication of Apartheid and the building of a 
non-racist, non-sexist future’.125 The practise of SDI represents a departure from such notions of 
inclusivity. At first glance the SDI strategy seems to offer a wealth of opportunities for 
engagement with grassroots actors. Indeed the SDI aims of creating jobs and ensuring Black 
economic empowerment would seem inextricably bound up with the facilitation of bottom-up 
activity. DTI Special Projects Manager Paul Jourdan, the man effectively leading the SDI process 
at the national level sees things rather differently, ‘rapid is not negotiable and the speed of the 
process precludes a bottom-up approach’.126  
In the case of WCII the line ‘we don’t have time to consult every hockey club’ has become 
something of a catch phrase justifying a top-down approach.127 As a result there was minimal 
involvement of NGOs and CBOs in the majority of Investor Conference oriented WCII 
projects.128 The reality is that the SDI could and should have been a vehicle for tackling local 
capacity weakness, either directly or through parallel initiatives. International experience indicates 
that capacity building is not only possible but in fact is essential to the process of economic and 
social development in countries racked by social polarisation. WCII methodology has opened up 
spaces for local actors but these spaces have not been designed in such a way that takes account 
of the context and character of local groups. For example an otherwise highly successful SMME 
conference was organised by WCII in 1999 so that networking could take place between SMMEs 
and corporates. However many people took part not knowing why they were there or for what 
purpose.129 Work could and should have been done to build local grassroots capacity in a 
number of ways such that SMMEs can tap effectively into these types of opportunities.  
In discussing the consultative process, the defensive reactions of people involved in the project 
over this issues needs addressing. It is clear that there is a difference of definition. There was 
undoubtedly much consultation - in both SDIs - during the start-up phase. However, one has to 
question the character and impact of the consultation. Who was consulted and how much 
“voice” or influence did different interest groups have? Clearly, there was much consultation with 
formal established interest groups. However, research on the ground, with a very wide array of 
sources, all point in one direction: grassroots actors, non-governmental organisations, community-
based organisations etc. had little input. This is well documented and in the public domain, as 
exhibited by the bold assertion of the DTI Special Projects Manager quoted above.130 In case this 
point is misunderstood, it needs to be stated quite clearly: in our research, on the ground, in 
numerous interviews with key participants, from the state and non-state sector, from local, 
provincial and national level, we came across no one who claimed that there was widespread 
consultation with local communities. It is suggested that this is one way in which the SDI 
methodology could be reappraised for the future.  Indeed similar findings were discussed in 
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research conducted in 1998.131 The author devoted considerable space to outlining the 
perceptions of a West Coast councillor who questioned the character of participation in early 
stages of WCII. For example it was noted that participation had largely been limited to those 
already “in the loop”.  The report continues “…the drivers of the SDIs needed to ensure that 
mechanisms were built in, in the form of parallel capacity building processes…that was the lack.”   
It should be noted that the post-Investor Conference, exit-phase of WCII was characterised by a 
sea change in approach to consultation. Incidentally, the effectiveness of this phase was greatly 
enhanced by the appointment of a WCII fieldworker with extensive local knowledge which, 
combined with his vision and diplomatic skills, earned him great respect amongst entrepreneurs, 
communities and officials. The more “innovative and new projects”, such as the Paternoster Fish 
Market, have been structured around a more community-based approach. Many observers 
fervently hope that lessons learnt from such projects will enable similar developments to become 
fashionable within local and provincial government policy circles.  
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6. Time Frames and the Integration Process 
SDIs are intended to be a short-term, fast track intervention acting as a catalyst for long-term 
growth. For a three to four year period, a designated project manager works with a small team of 
staff and consultants identifying potential projects, seeking investors and facilitating the 
development of key organisations and institutions on the ground. After this period of time, it is 
intended that provincial and local government carry on the work following the implementation of 
a transitional exit strategy. At first glance, such a sequence of events sounds entirely logical and 
appropriate, however there are problems. 
WCII entered its exit phase in 1999 and, by the latter half of 2000, was itself contracting as staff 
were transferred to other posts within the province. WCII activities began the process of transfer 
into local and provincial governments. The loss of WCII’s on the ground personnel has already 
impacted greatly upon the Saldanha/Vredenberg area. The ability of these individuals to network 
and bring key actors together was appreciated by various other role players. Such processes were 
aided by their personal qualities as well as the fact that they could devote all their attentions to 
these tasks, as this was what they were paid to do. In their absence, co-ordination of groups such 
as the LED Forum now falls to its members, all of whom have full time employment and therefore 
lack the necessary time and energy.132 Such bodies can quickly become marginalised and 
ineffective.133  
The WCII time frame also loses legitimacy when the process of change in South African local 
government organisation is considered. This is different from whether the WCII itself was 
compromised and has little or nothing to do with political discontinuity per se but is related to the 
procedural mechanisms of transition. Local councils have been transitional for some time as 
significant reorganisation is due to be implemented following the elections at the end of 2000. 
Considerable changes will be taking place in the spatial organisation and structure of local 
government. Restructuring of posts and officers will clearly lead to a temporary slow down in 
decision-making about issues such as local economic development. There will inevitably be a 
period of upheaval followed by gradual bedding in of the new arrangements. The success of 
WCII staff has led local councillors to the realisation that it would be appropriate to appoint an 
officer to manage and direct economic activity. Yet due to the changes in local government 
organisation it is thought unlikely that such an appointment could take place before July 2001 - 
leaving a hiatus of nearly a year without such support.134 It would have perhaps been advisable 
for private funding to keep the local economic development officer in place until the local council 
was in a position to appoint one for themselves. The significant point from this is that the time 
frame ascribed to the SDI methodology should be more flexible and sensitive to local factors and 
conditions. It would have been preferable for WCII to continue operating until at least winter 
2001 so that the transition could take place within the setting of the newly organised council 
arrangements. 
It is unfortunate that such a problem was not foreseen and steps taken to ease the transition. In 
other words it hardly seems timely to transfer responsibility for continuation and completion of 
WCII projects before the political transition phase had taken place. Whilst one could argue that 
local administrators should have foreseen this problem and acted accordingly, local informants 
counter-claim that they were not aware of the brevity of the WCIIs involvement and expressed 
shock when the integration process began. It is apparent that local government has been poorly 
prepared for either a decline in activity by WCII staff or an increase in activities required by its 
own departments. Indeed a senior source within local government indicated that he was unaware 
that WCII’s activities were to be scaled back until the process actually started. WCII’s project 
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manager is adamant that such information related to the integration was provided to all relevant 
parties.135  Once again, communication between different levels seems compromised. 
The process of transition has left WCII with a rather fuzzy identity. An entity called WCII still 
exists, as a spatially delineated area, through the symbolism of the WCII emblem which adorns 
WCII stationery emanating from provincial government and the WCII website amongst other 
things. As a brand name for investors, it is important that WCII is perceived to be a stable and 
durable entity. However with the loss of WCII as a central institution, there is potential for 
confusion and misunderstandings. Some observers have asked directly ‘who is championing WCII 
now?’136 Respondents spoken to within the West Coast have indicated that there has been a 
noticeable decline in the intensity of interactions with former WCII staff even though the ex-
project manager and other ex-WCII staff are still responsible for various components of WCII 
activities in their new jobs.137  
 It appears that the origin of the sequencing methodology lies within the DTI in Pretoria. It is 
unclear whether decisions relating to the precise timing of events came as a result of consultation 
and negotiation with those familiar with conditions on the ground. It certainly seems to be the 
case that key actors within the West Coast local government and business support services were 
unaware beforehand of significant events such as the transferral of WCII’s project workers to 
other posts in the province. Therefore little time was available for interim measures to be devised. 
Virtually all respondents were in agreement that WCII’s life span prior to integration was too brief. 
Issues of maintaining continuity in the process, and the transfer of knowledge invested in key 
individuals were repeatedly raised. Compounding this problem has been the inexplicable delay by 
the DTI in handing down the budget to the province as agreed.138 
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7. Summary of lessons learnt from both SDIs 
In summary, if one were to abridge the lessons that may be drawn from the MDC and WCII 
processes thus far, a number of key factors can be identified: 
• A well-defined and operating institutional and bureaucratic framework is required. 
• An integrated and well-researched planning process is necessary - perhaps slowing down the 
fast-track approach. 
• Capacity and training of bureaucrats involved in implementing policy is urgently needed. 
• Capacity amongst previously disadvantaged entrepreneurs needs building up.  
• Domestic private investment needs to be actively mobilised. 
• A more coherent approach to poverty alleviation and questions of gender and racial 
inequality needs addressing. 
In short, delivery along the MDC and the WCII has not been as effective as it could be due to 
the overtly top-down nature of the SDI process. The methodology of the SDI programme has paid 
too little attention to local conditions or realities. In addition, the overall time frame is unrealistic 
and there has been little engagement with addressing serious capacity problems, particularly at 
the provincial and local level, which threatens to sabotage coherent implementation. This is truer 
of the MDC than it is of the WCII. Furthermore, the effective centralisation and personalisation of 
key roles militates against effective hand-over during the exit phase and stimulates tensions 
surrounding questions of ownership. It is clear that political champions are required to advance 
much of the process, particularly regarding issues of empowerment. As one analysis of the MDC 
suggests, ‘the success of programmes targeted towards objectives of empowerment or changing 
the structure of ownership of enterprises within the South Africa [economy] is ultimately reliant 
upon the existence of political will for transformation and not just a policy framework per se’.139 
The speedy time frame and rejection of the various “hockey clubs” that need consulting, coupled 
with the rapid withdrawal of energetic champions, militates against success on this score. 
It is clear that the SDI concept can be seen as an ingenious one, which aims to maximise 
human and physical resources. This working paper has demonstrated many strengths within the 
methodology, such as strong project teams, thorough and well-organised approaches, excellent 
work building up certain forms of institutional capacity within the SDIs reviewed and emphasising 
skills development and education. However, it is also clear that there are lessons to be learned, as 
outlined above, which if acted upon could improve the delivery of ongoing and future SDIs. 
                                                 
139 Christian Rogerson, 2000, p. 564. 
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Appendix: List of people interviewed/corresponded with 
1. Dr Alfredo Namitete , Chairman, Committee of Senior Officials, Southern African Transport 
and Communications Commission, Maputo, April 6, 2000. 
2. Gordon Griffiths, Chief Executive Officer, Mpumalanga Investment Initiative, Nelspruit, April 
4, 2000. 
3. David Arkwright, project manager, Maputo Corridor, Nelspruit, April 12, 2000. 
4. Francisca Henriqueta Soares, transport economist, Mozambican Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, Maputo, April 10, 2000. 
5. Dr Milissão Nvunga, lecturer at the Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionals, Maputo, 
April 7, 2000. 
6. Greg White , head of Private Sector Investments, Development Bank of Southern Africa, 
Halfway House, April 14, 2000. 
7. Jonathan Mitchell, Economist, Special Projects and Policy Unit, Mpumalanga Province, 
Nelspruit April 5, 2000. 
8. Wolfgang Thomas, Chief Economist, Wesgro, Cape Town 4, 2000. 
9. Laurine Platzky, WCII Project Manager, 15 September 2000. 
10. Laurine Platzky, Deputy Director-General, Business Promotion, Department of Economic 
Affairs, Agriculture and Tourism, Western Cape, January 2, 2001 and 25th May 2001 
(electronic correspondence). 
11. Trudy Mills, Collen Lopez and Gert Van Zyl, WCBDC, October 3, 2000 and April 5th 2001.  
12. Frieda Krohn, Saldanha Steel,  October 3, 2000. 
13. John October, Human Resources Manager (formerly Business Development Manager) 
Saldanha Steel, October 4th 2000. 
14. Ben Veldman, former WCII exit phase manager, September 20, 2000. 
15. John de Klerk, Town Clerk, West Coast Peninsula Transitional Local Council October 5, 
2000. 
16. Pieter Pistorious, Saldanha Steel engineer, Saldanha. 
17. Peter Jordaan, former WCII exit phase manager, September 2000 and April  2001.  
18. Rianne Warie, rural researcher/regional economist Wesgro, September 18, 2000. 
19. Stan Visser, Director of Economic Planning, Blauuberg Council, September 19, 2000. 
20. Rob Davies MP, DTI, October 18th 2000. 
21. Maxwell Moss, Saldanha MP, March  20th 2001. 
22. Karl Kloete, NUMSA, March  23rd 2001.  




23. Louw Liebenburg, NBI, March  16th 2001. 
24. Adrian Sayers, Provincial Development Council, March 23rd  2001. 
25. Ebrahim Nackerdien, Saldanha Bay Municipality, April 4th 2001. 
Informal interviews with local business people, Nelspruit, April 3, 2000.  
Information gleaned from informal conversations with informal traders outside Nelspruit, April 3-
4. 2000.  
Various interviews conducted with entrepreneurs, community leaders and local officials in 
Saldanha/Vredenburg October 2000 and March/April 2001.  
